

TOP SECRET

DIAIAPPR 34-75
7 MARCH 1975

Return to

25X1A

DIA Declassification/Release Instructions
on File



DEVELOPS PLANS
AND CAPABILITIES TO
EXERCISE MILITARY OPTION (C)

25X1A



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DCI/IC

WARNING INTELLIGENCE APPRAISAL

**THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL**

193

COPY _____
502089

Warning Notice

Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

CLASSIFIED BY DoD Dir. S-5200.17 (M-2)
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 2
DECLASSIFY ON Date Cannot Be Determined

TOP SECRET

No Foreign Dissem
Controlled Dissem
No Dissem Abroad
Background Use Only

KEY TO CLASSIFICATION AND HANDLING
CAVEAT ABBREVIATIONS USED IN DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CURRENT INTELLI-
GENCE PUBLICATIONS.

TOP SECRET (TS); SECRET (S); CONFIDENTIAL (C)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM (NFD) - Originator has determined that the information must not be released in any form, not even by paraphrasing, to foreign governments.

NO DISSEM ABROAD (NDA) - The information will not be sent outside the continental United States, Hawaii, and Alaska, except as determined by the originator in order to satisfy special conditions.


BACKGROUND USE ONLY (BUO) - The information will not be included in any other document or publication without the specific approval of the originating organization.

CONTROLLED DISSEM (CD) - Limits distribution to personnel within the intelligence components of USEIB member agencies. Such information will not be disseminated to contractors.

WARNING NOTICE: SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED (WNSISMI) - The intent of this warning is to emphasize the sensitivity of the information and the need for special controls while permitting distribution to individuals with a valid need to know.

TOP SECRET UMBRA

EGYPTIAN FORCE DEPLOYMENTS AS OF 6 OCT 73*



NOTE: DOTTED SYMBOLS REPRESENT CURRENT UNIT DISPOSITIONS AND ARROWS INDICATE REDEPLOYMENTS SINCE 6 OCT 73

TOP SECRET UMBRA

*SADAT DEVELOPS PLANS AND CAPABILITIES
TO EXERCISE MILITARY OPTION (C)*

*DIAIAPPR 34-75
7 MARCH 1975*



EGYPT

25X1A

SADAT DEVELOPS PLANS AND CAPABILITIES
TO EXERCISE MILITARY OPTION (C)

Summary

(S/NFD) There are firm indications that President Sadat has placed Egypt in a position where he can adopt a military option at any time he feels appropriate. Ambiguous statements by Sadat and the Soviets have projected an impression that serious shortages exist in Egypt's armed forces. Actually, however, it appears the Egyptian leader has extensively reorganized, trained, and perhaps deceptively rearmed his armed forces through a variety of efforts.

(S/NFD) While Sadat seeks to regain territory through the step-by-step process with US assistance, he is apprehensive of achieving success by negotiation. He has restored his armed forces to a capability and posture approximating that existing prior to hostilities in October 1973; and is now capable of exercising a credible military option. His actions reflect careful planning for military alternatives should diplomatic activity fail. An Egyptian decision to initiate hostilities is now a political one, and the stage is almost set.

Contingency Planning For Offensive Operations

[REDACTED] There are now several convincing reports that Sadat has ordered a change in his army's orientation from defensive to offensive planning. Even though this may have been done to placate his military leaders, it constitutes a prudent action to insure the availability of a military option should diplomatic efforts atrophy. In conjunction with this planning redirection, [REDACTED]

DIA 25X1

DIA 25X1
DIA 25X1

DIA 25X1

[REDACTED] Gamasy made a secret visit to the Suez front in early January and met

DIA 25X1

(Continued)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

with senior army commanders. He asked them to prepare a list of arms, ammunition, and equipment requirements in order to be ready for war in three months. Gamasy said that it was an order from the political echelon and requested that the lists be sent directly to him. [REDACTED]

DIA 25X1

DIA 25X1

-- According to [REDACTED] a new, deliberate offensive plan was being prepared for use against fixed Israeli positions. The strength of all military units is being raised to 100 percent active personnel, and all units are to be at full operational strength after 6 Mar 75. [REDACTED] that three special one-month courses to train new recruits were being run, with the last to end on 6 Mar 75.

DIA 25X1

DIA 25X1

--As of December 1974, the Egyptians stopped releasing troops from duty and have been quietly recalling previously separated personnel on an individual basis. Although there is evidence that Egypt has reorganized its entire reserve mobilization system, specific details are lacking. [REDACTED] reflect that some reserve personnel are being called up. It is possible that this mustering has been implemented only to test mobilization; however, a secondary purpose could be to conduct periodic reserve training in conjunction with active units. A worse-case possibility is that the current reserve call up is part of Gen Gamasy's plan to have all army units at full strength by the end of this month.

25X1D

25X1D

Soviet Deliveries

(S/NFD) While the Soviet resupply effort during and immediately after the October 1973 war replenished most major military equipment losses, there still does not appear to have been a one-for-one replacement of all major end items. The shortage is particularly evident in the air force, which is approximately 30 percent below its prewar inventory of combat aircraft.

(S/NFD) Until early February 1975, there had been no significant Soviet arms deliveries of major end items since April 1974. Moscow resumed aircraft deliveries on 6 February when at least 10 MIG-23/FLOGGER and 10 SU-20/ FITTER C aircraft were unloaded in Alexandria. This

(Continued)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

TOP SECRET UMBRA

action probably stemmed from an agreement reached last December during the visit of the Egyptian Foreign Minister and Defense Minister to Moscow.

(S/NFD) There are reports that the resumption of aircraft deliveries is part of a massive Soviet resupply effort initiated last January to complete the rearmament of Egypt by the end of this month. [REDACTED]

DIA DIA 25X1

25X1A [REDACTED] claimed that Egypt "was to have received" 900 modified T-54/-55/-62 tanks as well as SCUD SSMS and SAMS. These sources further stated that Cairo hoped to complete resupply actions by the end of March. This would provide Egypt with sufficient equipment to conduct a 30- to 40-day war with Israel. Satellite photography of 5 Jan 75 covering the port of Nikolayev revealed the largest amount of military equipment awaiting export since the October war. Approximately 54 tanks, 134 APCs, 62 ZSU-23/4 antiaircraft guns, and 12 aircraft shipping crates were among the items observed. It cannot be established that Egypt has received a large share of it, but neither can it be fully accounted for in other countries.

DIA 25X1

Possible Egyptian Duplicity

DIA 25X1

(TS UMBRA/NFD) According to [REDACTED] and contrary to public pronouncements, relations between Moscow and Cairo were excellent as of early January; Sadat's public condemnations of Soviet arms policies represented part of a mutually agreed upon dissimulation policy designed to mislead both the West and Israelis relative to actual Egyptian military capabilities. Additionally, both Egypt and the USSR have reportedly made concerted efforts to hide rearmament progress from Tel Aviv, probably for fear of an Israeli preemptive strike before resupply was completed.

-- To conceal the current resupply effort, arms are being bought for Egypt by missions from various Arab countries that are operating in both Eastern and Western Europe. Accordingly, Egypt has received tanks, APCs, and heavy guns from countries such as Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, with deliveries being made by both East European and Soviet merchantmen.

-- Additionally, with the improvement of relations between Egypt and Libya, it appears that Libya has begun

(Continued)

TOP SECRET UMBRA

transferring artillery spare parts to Egypt. According to [REDACTED] Cairo hopes to receive greater quantities and more diversified equipment from Libya in the future.

DIA 25X1

-- War supplies are reportedly being sent to Tripoli and Benghazi for transshipment to Egypt. If true, this circuitous mode of delivery is obviously aimed at deceiving Western and Israeli observers.

25X1A

-- The Soviet resupply effort is reported to be a very closely held secret in Cairo. Many high military and political leaders there are not privy to the rearmament scheme. This may partially account for the paucity of confirmatory information.

25X1A

(S/NFD) Statements made by Sadat and Gamasy to US congressional leaders last month stressed that Egypt had received no replacements between 6 Oct 73 and 29 Jan 75. The argument that such items do not constitute replacements, even though some of the materiel received probably was, in fact, on order prior to the October war, seems specious and intended to mislead Western leaders. Other supporting evidence of possible Egyptian duplicity include the following:

-- Most of Sadat's references to Egyptian involvement in offensive actions have been obliquely phrased. His only clear assertions have been that Cairo would support Syria if it is attacked by Israel, and that there would be no alternative to war if efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement collapse.

-- In all his speeches and interviews to date, Sadat has stressed his commitment to a peaceful settlement and has avoided any attempt to intimidate Israel by mention of Egyptian offensive intentions.

Force Assessment

(TS UMBRA/NFD) A review of current Egyptian force deployment and activities indicates that rebuilding has been generally achieved and that readiness, training capabilities, and disposition are essentially what they were on 6 Oct 73 (See map opposite).

-- Egypt currently has five infantry divisions in forward positions along the Suez Canal, three of which

(Continued)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

have an independent armored brigade in direct support. The second echelon contains two mechanized infantry divisions and the reserve two armored divisions. The understrength 6th Mechanized Infantry Division at Dahshur provides part of a final defensive reserve in the Cairo area and could be within 60 days of completing its rebuilding and retraining.

-- As of the end of 1974, all armored and mechanized units, except for the 6th Mechanized and some tank battalions in infantry divisions, were equipped at pre-October 1973 levels. In fact, there are now two additional armored brigades that did not exist before the October war. Egyptian armored units are also better equipped than before that conflict. Of the 11 armored brigades, five have their mechanized infantry battalions equipped with the BMP amphibious armored infantry combat vehicle. The entire 21st Armored Division, the 55th and 25th Armored Brigades, and probably the 15th Armored Brigade are equipped with the T-62 tank.

[REDACTED] This leads to the conclusion that sufficient spare parts are available for the day-to-day maintenance of forces. However, there is a lack of evidence that reserve stocks of spare parts are adequate for high-intensity combat operations. [REDACTED]

DIA 25X1
DIA 25X1

[REDACTED] If, in fact, severe ammunition shortages do exist, it would seem that training rounds would be curtailed to those essential for crew qualification. Perhaps more significantly, no feverish activity on the part of the Egyptians to procure ammunition supplies have been noted, which alleged critical shortages could be expected to precipitate. The logic of the above suggests that the Egyptian Army believes it has sufficient stocks to support offensive operations.

DIA 25X1
DIA 25X1

-- Egyptian Air Surveillance (ASV) units have been reorganized and streamlined. This realignment apparently was designed to improve effectiveness of the total air defense system by better integrating the ASV, SAM, ADA, and fighter aircraft defense systems.

(Continued)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

-- Between September and December 1974, there was a gradual eastward shift of SA-6/GAINFUL units toward the limited-forces line. [REDACTED]

DIA 25X1

DIA 25X1

(S/NFD) In summary, although current deployments are essentially the same as existed on 6 Oct 73, the following improvements have been made:

- Five each additional SA-2 and SA-6 units with improved proficiency have been formed;
- Two additional armored brigades are now present;
- Key armored elements are now equipped with the T-62 tank; and, eight mechanized infantry battalions now have the BMP amphibious armored infantry combat vehicle.

Portents Of Hostilities

(S/NFD) During the past six months, key Arab figures have warned that the month of April would be critical for the Arabs.

-- According [REDACTED]

DIA 25X1

[REDACTED] a secret resolution of the Rabat conference of last October was to allow the US six months to achieve Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territory. During this period no confrontation state was to resume the battle with Israel.

DIA 25X1

-- President Sadat publicly stated in early January that discontinuation of Soviet arms aid required Egypt to work out a new military strategy and that the next few months would be particularly critical. Accordingly, [REDACTED] emphasis was placed on the development of an offensive capability.

DIA 25X1

DIA 25X1

-- In mid-January, the Egyptian leader said that the Israelis must allow some movement on all fronts within three months, and that if they were not prepared to negotiate a package deal, there could be no alternative to war.

-- The same month, Gen Gamasy declared that Soviet

(Continued)

~~TOP SECRET UMBRA~~

)

military aid was essential if Egypt were to be able to participate effectively in the next round of fighting, which could begin as early as April 1975. On 2 March, he stated: "I felt it particularly important at this time prior to the next round of negotiations to ensure myself personally that the Egyptian Army can support President Sadat in the next round of discussions."

-- Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam has stated that despite his government's agreement in November to extend the mandate of the UN Observer Force (UNDOF) in the Golan Heights region for another six months, Syria would refuse to extend it again unless there was some visible progress in the peace negotiations during the intervening six months.

Conclusions

(S/NFD) President Sadat still appears to prefer a political solution to the Middle East crisis. However, he has now taken the highly pragmatic steps of rearming the Egyptian armed forces and preparing offensive plans. These precautionary moves will enable him to react militarily -- if he perceives it to be necessary -- to any politically induced contingencies. As noted in the DIA Warning Intelligence Appraisal of 7 Nov 74, unless there were positive diplomatic developments, there was a 90 percent probability that hostilities would resume within the next year. This judgment still appears to be valid, and Sadat's actions indicate that he has now consciously prepared for this eventuality. (XGDS-2)

25X1A



TOP SECRET

**THIS DOCUMENT
CONTAINS
SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE MATERIAL**

TOP SECRET